Wednesday, 23 December 2015

On Agents of Influence

(Originally on 21 Dec. 2015)

Some time ago, I was enquired what are those agents of influence I had written about. Agent of influence is one of the roles in which an agent can work on behalf of a foreign power. The role and working ways of an agent of influence are quite different from those of, for example, an agent provocateur or a useful idiot – two other types often mentioned in texts about information warfare.

An agent can act on behalf of other players also, besides foreign states – companies and corporations, political parties, lobbies, and even civil society organizations use agents. The so called change agents constitute an example of the consult jargon that has spread to civil society. This article deals primarily with agents working for a foreign government in Finland, but the principle is the same also in private sector, and especially so in regard to agents of influence because they do much the same that lobbyists and change agents do – i.e. try to influence matters and affairs in favour of their agenda.

Agents of influence are usually found to be more difficult to expose and counteract, compared with such agents of foreign powers who do things like steal secret documents, bribe officials of railways and the post or the cleaning-lady of a defence institution's IT centre, install explosives, or cultivate a terrorist group to destabilize a country. This is for the reason that agents of influence very often do not need to break laws in any way.

Unlike lobbyists openly working to promote the interests of let's say eastern trade, agents of influence act in a more conspiratorial manner and seek to conceal the fact they work for a foreign power. Their effect is much bigger if they manage to present themselves as 'impartial' or even experts and authorities of the issues in question.

In some occasions they may also use the so-called false flag – meaning they would claim to represent quite different an interest party than the one they really work for. In such cases there may be similarity to the actions of provocateurs, who commonly use the false flag as they seek to foment controversies, incite hatred against a group, or just divert attention and move the gravitational centre of the opinion spectrum. False flag is rarer with the agents of influence. Much more common for them is to present their agenda as 'impartial' and 'pragmatic'. As agents of influence are supposed to be taken seriously, provocateurs take care of the loud barking, which indeed makes the message of the agents of influence appear moderate.

Russia has penetrated all systems in Finland on such a high and deep systemic levels that she can obtain any relevant information available in Finland, if she so wishes. Russia's capacity enables her to analytically or operatively utilize information available in Finland in more effective and focused manner than what Finland's own capacity allows. It is exactly in the analysis and operationalization of information where the Finnish capacities are rather weak. Finland is able to utilize information available in her own country, let alone elsewhere, only to the extent within her limited capacities.

Therefore, Russian agents need not concentrate in traditional espionage. In a country as open as Finland, the main task of Russian operatives is influence, not espionage – however, this does not refute the fact that Russia is overwhelmingly the most active and the most aggressive actor also in espionage. It is nothing new that in Russian information warfare influence takes priority over espionage. This was the case also in the Soviet times, which has been discussed in public for instance by the KGB defector Yuri Bezmenov.

The Finns had better understand especially how crucial role activities of influence have as compared to the illegal methods used in espionage. I am afraid that in the stubbornly legalist Finland this is still not quite understood, as discussion is still centred at the protection from traditional espionage, terrorism, and cyber threats targeting vital infrastructure. Not at the integrity of information content – that is, at knowing things – which is the target of the most intensive efforts of Russian agents.

The targets of the agents of influence include what Finns think they know, which situational understanding they have, what opinions they hold of things, where is their attention – and through the influence in these what is called 'reflexive control' in the terms of Russian information warfare takes place. That means, the target is successfully manipulated to act in the way desired by the manipulator, through compromising influence in his informational integrity.

Finland does not seem to find ways to counteract against agents of influence in any way because the latter are unlikely to commit to anything illegal. The country has a long tradition of exclusion, on purely ideological grounds (the so-called 'general reasons'), those opinions and individuals that were deemed anti-Soviet in the old times or anti-Russian in contemporary terms from the acceptable consciousness. Yet the reverse has proven very hard in Finland. An agent of influence may act however strikingly and yet no control mechanisms for his exclusion take place, not even in the most critical tasks regarding national security and informational integrity.

It is in most cases not illegal to lie and to manipulate, and this is truer still in regard to more subtle methods. Finnish mentality is conditioned to watch over decency and good manners in various, more irrelevant matters, yet when it comes to the 'general reasons', legal offenses need to be rather blatant before anyone deems it appropriate, or even possible, to do anything. It sometimes seems there's no limit to those offenses even at high treason or at support for terrorism, if 'general reasons' are in question.

If Finland does not fix the basic systemic problems in informational interest and informational ideology, there is a risk that new investments in electronic intelligence, costly technological solutions, or information bying from external subcontractors may actually only constitute subvention of the adversary's intelligence from Finnish tax revenues.

What kind of things, then, are the agents of influence engaged with?

It is logical to assume that they do at least two kinds of things: Firstly, they spread information and opinions that support their agenda. Secondly, they seek to prevent the spread of information and opinions that run counter to their agenda.

In the first case their impact is similar to that of propaganda, but it is usually more focused and sophisticated. Agents of influence whisper to the ears of decision-makers and opinion-makers – for example, politicians, civil servants, journalists, and academics. In the second case, they seek to form filters and obstacles to the ears of the mentioned groups, to obstruct reception of correct information and undesired opinions, for example by discreditation, questioning, and conditioning such information and opinions.

Spreading wrong or biased information is typical activity for agents of influence. The information operations they conduct or support are often detectable by their calculated timing. It usually happens in the very situations when Russia has an interest in spreading false information or in changing the topic. An influence agent's informational operation is often also synchronized to coincide with the flooding of similar or similarly inclined content by the media-distributed propaganda machinery and troll factories.

Influence to attitudes and opinions is another form of activity, more long-termed and often more difficult to detect. It consists of manipulation of the opinion spectrum of decision-makers and opinion-makers as well as the general public opinion. Russian information operations targeting attitudes have sought, for instance, to generate negative conditioning towards Moscow's opponents and entire nationalities. This has resulted in unconscious negative or at least suspicious 'gut feelings' towards those peoples who have stood on the way of the aggressions of Russia or her allies – for example Chechens, Albanians, the Baltics, and Georgians. Finns have occasionally been quite eager to resort to condescension and mock at small East European nations, let alone further-away ones, without noticing their attitudes have fallen prey to manipulation.

Individual people are also targeted with similar methods of manipulation: agents of influence seek to generate negative or ridiculing conditioning towards critics of the Kremlin, politicians, intellectuals, researchers, or journalists. Many Finns, who may consider themselves serious and respectable, hardly notice how they add to the choir of mock and undermining, although in regard to someone else, those parts of their brains that call for respect and rational approach would immediately be activated at such. Manipulation of attitudes usually affects through emotional conditioning.

Propaganda is often divided into white and black propaganda, and this is the case also with information operations and influence to attitudes. What is basically true, or meant to enhance positive image, is called white propaganda – it is also practiced by Western countries, including Finland seeking to spread information and reports that are flattering to the country such as the Pisa results, or beautiful and pure ideas of Finland. Black propaganda is more characteristic to actors like Russia: it doesn't shun outrageous lies or smear campaigns. There are naturally various shades of grey between black and white propaganda.

Another standard practice of the agents of influence is to brand certain subjects by stirring controversies. When those topics that are particularly sensitive to the 'general reasons' are branded as controversial, rational conversation on them becomes difficult. Discussion gets polarized and emotional, which in the Finnish culture works particularly well in favour of the manipulators.

Agents of influence are skilled to exploit the cultural characteristics of their target society. Finns are rendered vulnerable to influence by many oddities of our communication culture. As an example, Finns are exceptionally touchy about dissent in opinions, and they generally seek to avoid debate, taking it personal and considering it a threat to the desired consensual state of communication. In contrast, Finns overrate vagueness and purposeless verbosity when it helps to avoid expressing opinions – often at the same time at the expense of also content. It is an old cliché that Finns ceaselessly wonder what the others think of them, but not a baseless one. Finns consider it wise to remove from topics that risk bringing up debate – that is, differing opinions. The Finnish culture is one of avoiding communication and certainly preferring silence to dissent.

Finland also has a culture of avoiding responsibility, although this may be a rather new cultural phenomenon. Opinions are usually expressed in passive form, or otherwise in a way that would make it seem as if the speaker doesn't express his own opinion but rather something 'generally thought', or an idea originating somewhere else. It enables the speaker to avoid responsibility for what he states. This characteristic of the Finnish culture makes the work of an agent of influence easier, as when they spread false or biased information, fellow Finns don't demand them to explicate their personal opinion let alone take responsibility for it.

One of the most important uses of power in a state system is nominations. Democracy tends to decentralize power, which means that each individual only does his or her part in a large machinery of decision-making. Therefore political power at its most practical is to push the right people to the right places in order to make those decisions desired. Seasoned professionals of politics are professional in exactly this kind of machinations. Unfortunately, so are also foreign intelligence organs, with their agents of influence.

In Finland, positive pushing of one's favourites to favourable positions for influence requires existent power positions or the so-called 'good fellow networks', sometimes just a good game-eye in situations where parties distribute seats among themselves, or in other words, reach political compromises. Here I will not comment on the extent to which foreign states may already possess extant formal power positions in this country. It is natural that from such positions it is rather easy to machinate agents of influence directly to key positions.

Negative influence, however, is easy in the Finnish culture also from outside the formal power positions. For example, spreading malicious rumours and disinformation about individual persons has been standard activity for agents of influence since the Soviet times. In Finland, such activity is particularly effective because Finns are in general timid and avoid controversies. They would rather not take the risk than check the veracity of rumours. In such a culture those who do use malicious disinformation to block nominations have an advantage, and further enhance the culture of timidity and harmlessness.

Another method of person-level influence, slightly more radical than the spreading of rumours, is the use of threats. It typically takes place in form of covert threats, which do not fulfil the criteria for illegal threat (a legal offense) and therefore doesn't trigger criminal investigation. Alternatively, it consists of anonymous messages and phonecalls, so that even when the criteria for illegal threat would be fulfilled, the culprit is not known, or finding out the sender would require means that are so far outside of the legal options for Finnish authorities.

Agents of influence obviously also probe for weaknesses and practice stirring of conflicts. In such practices they should not be confused with another category of agents, the talent-spotters, whose tasks include identification of persons as potential targets for the operations of professional intelligence operatives – for example for cultivation, recruitment, or 'kompromat' [compromising operations, usually targeted against a person's reputation by framing the target as pervert, mentally ill, politically incorrect, criminal, or something else that seeks to discredit him/her].

Simply leading – or misleading – discussion is a routine activity of the agents of influence. They will, whenever possible, help Finnish politicians, reporters and audience to fuss about what's irrelevant, and to silence about what's relevant. Once again, the careful timing and synchronization with the narratives offered by Russian propaganda often make such deliberate guidance detectable.

Finally, it is necessary to practice some caution against the other extreme: While healthy suspicion is usually beneficial, all-engulfing paranoia is malignant. Not all information consists of lies, and not all lies constitute deliberate operations of influence. One should not keep his own mouth shut in fear of agents of influence – quite the contrary, one does better in promoting open and honest information culture, where it makes sense to analyse and organize information, and where the existence of opinions is not feared or shamed, not even for 'general reasons'.

If I have managed to raise the reader's level of consciousness in recognizing a relevant dimension of informational influence, it means my own information operation has been successful. 

Friday, 9 October 2015

A Finnish Book on Lustration

(Originally on 20 May, 2015.)

An interesting booklet was published this year in Finland, named Lustraatio ("Lustration"), written by writer and activist Jukka Mallinen, journalist Martti Puukko, and researcher Arto Luukkanen, who is specialized in Russia. The book was edited by a young publishing entrepreneur Pekka Virkki. From the perspective of my current country of residence, Ukraine, it was interesting to read Finnish thoughts about lustration and about potential applications of this principle to cleaning out the mess left behind by Finlandization.

To the extent that the word lustration is at all familiar for Finns, it became known as one of the key demands of the Maidan demonstrators, and a slogan in the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity. The word is derived from ancient Roman purification rituals, but it was in active use in Eastern Europe when the communist regimes collapsed and societies wanted to settle scores with their past.

The idea for example in the lustration processes of the Baltic countries, Poland, and Czech Republic was to cleanse bureaucracies and state elites from the henchmen of the KGB and its sister organs. Those who admitted their sins often got acquitted from formal criminal charges, while if they tried to conceal their past and got caught, they would lose their official positions. Lustration was also an important element to counter corruption, as corruption was usually closely linked with the power relations of the former communist regimes and especially their security organs. Lustration would prevent secrets from poisoning the reconstruction of democratic, European, open societies.

Another key conception of the book is Finlandization, a name originally given by West German press to the peculiar Finnish practice of pleasing Moscow. In line of that practice the political elite of Finland was self active in restricting the nation's sovereignty and societal freedom, whereas Finnish media and academic circles learned to practice self-censorship, to discriminate the wrong-opined, and to condition their thinking into what Moscow would be likely to tolerate.

The problem, as perceived in the book, is that unlike many East European countries, Finland did not, after the Cold War ended, sort out and investigate the connections and compromising relationships of its political, bureaucratic, economic and military elite with Soviet security services. Secrecy continues to poison the healing process of Finnish society, and has provided useful tools for the newly ruling KGB regime in Russia, which is known to have returned to use KGB instruments of influence to manipulate decision and opinion-makers in Finland and other European countries.

I have to admit that I had not yet read the book in its entirety when my attention was drawn to it by a series of strange reactions by some Finns. One such was published by the Russia researcher, Professor T. Vihavainen, in his blog, where in a critique soaked in insinuations and allusions, he dared not to name the book or its writers - although the target was evident. Another, equally odd and obviously defensive piece, the head of the Finnish National Archive Dr. J. Nuorteva attacked Dr. Luukkanen's archive research in the customers magazine of the Archives Service, Akti. Nuorteva's main point seemed to be that opening the Soviet archives was an "unwise" move from Ukraine, and if a Finnish researcher would study those archives, it could endanger access to cooperation with the archives of the Russian security service FSB, successor of the KGB. If anything, such reactions indicate something of the nature of what is wrong in the Finnish atmosphere concerning any opening up of the era of Finlandization.

The book of Mallinen, Puukko and Luukkanen is focused on the legacy of Finlandization and the lack of its deconstruction in Finland. Yet they also bring up a lot of historical analysis and context, from the era of Finland as a part of the Russian Empire (1809-1917) to the experiences Poland has had of post-Cold War lustration in the 1990s. Luukkanen throws around also examples from Germany's "management of past" (Vergangenheitbewältigung) and South Africa's "commission of truth".

Puukko writes about the Polish lustration experiences which he saw as a contemporary witness. People in Ukraine and to a large extent also in Finland have tended to think that it was exactly Poland that was the great success story in lustrating the system and reforming it into a European democracy. Yet Puukko's deserving contribution reminds us that it wasn't all that smooth there either.

What we often forget is the passing of time. Poland had time for its painful past management and reform work since the early 1990s. Back then the Yeltsin administration still sought to reform Russia into the European direction. A decade later at Putin's ascendance to power in Russia, Poland had already gained a critical head start to Western integration. Ukraine didn't have such an advantage since the Orange Revolution took place there only at the end of 2004. After that the country still made a major setback in 2010 into Yanukovich's reign, and another revolution was required to rid Ukraine from that. The latter started from an uprising in November 2013 and peaked at the Revolution of Dignity in February 2014.

Another large East European country might constitute a better reference point for Ukraine, namely Romania which in the 1990s first lagged clearly behind Poland and the rest of eastern Central Europe. Mystical fires occurred in the archives of the Securitate after Ceauşescu had been overthrown. Critical materials were destroyed, and thereby also the old powers resisted in power until the large demonstrations of 1995-1996, which finally pushed for a real power change and launched lustration in Romania. I remember how still in the late nineties many complained to me the miserable state of Romania, its corruption, and appeared convinced the country can never become an EU member. Well, things changed. Although Romania and Bulgaria are still the poorest of EU member states, reforms did take place in them and these countries changed significantly from what they were still in the nineties.

In any case Puukko narrates in a convincing way about the problems caused for the Polish society by the shortcomings in handling the communist heritage, the weakness of lustration, secrecy over the more shadowy sides of Lech Wałęsa's background, and from the fact that the representatives of the former communist security services could benefit from old power relations and from the information they possessed about people. I would have been delighted to read Puukko's views also about today's Poland, its active role in the events of Croatia, Georgia, and Ukraine, as well as about the Smolensk airplane crash.

Mallinen's elegant essay contribution sketches a kind of cultural autopsy for Finlandization and its historical backgrounds, which go back to the authoritarian traditions of the times under the tsar. Luukkanen touches upon the same topic for instance in his introduction of the activities of Bishop Jacob Tengström (1755-1832) as a useful collaborator of the Russian Empire, and a finlandizer of Finland even before the term was known. In Finlandized Finland, many reasonings were afterwisely constructed for why Tengström's conduct was to be seen positively. After all, he was advocating Russia's interests. It seemed not matter that from an objective point of view his actions constituted treason against Kingdom of Sweden, of which Finland was part.

In his essay named From the Duress of Things to the General Reasons, Mallinen traces the tsarist roots of Finlandization to the Diet of Porvoo in 1809, where the gentry of Finland paid homage to the Russian tsar - quite treasonably at their motherland Sweden - and to the meeting between Marshal Bernadotte, who had been installed as a king in Sweden, and the tsar in Turku in 1812 - where this marshal of Napoleon promised to the tsar, without consulting the Finns, that Sweden would no longer seek the return of Österland [the Eastern Land, i.e. Finland]. In more recent days neo-finlandizers have however praised "the policies of 1812" as an eternal basis for Finland's position. It appears they wish to return the border of Russia's sphere of interest to the Gulf of Bothnia.

Mallinen's inspection reminds us of the habits of the national conciliatory elite, who has since the times of the tsars beaten St. Petersburg's will, and later Moscow's, into the thick skulls of Finns as a necessity - a duress of things. Later the same thing was known by many other euphemisms, too: general reasons, geography, or friendly relations. It was not before the years of oppression that really awoke people to resistance, which created dynamism in the nation. Mallinen's portrayals of Finlandization in Finnish academic and cultural life are in fact awkward to read. Unfortunately myriad examples tell a sinister tale about a return to similar habits under Putin's reign.

Regrettably the book makes no reference to the materials that the journalist Juha-Pekka Tikka gathered in Cambridge from the KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhin's archive, concerning KGB contacts in Finland. Tikka reported his findings in an interesting series of articles in Verkkouutiset along the late summer and autumn of 2014. Even though the materials of the Mitrokhin archive would have been available for Finnish researchers for a rather long time, there has been some peculiar unwillingness to process them in Finland. The book also fails to refer to the information recently discussed by the intelligence historian Kimmo Rentola, partly based on Tikka's revelations. Rentola himself has a leftist background.

Furthermore, it would have been appropriate to note Ambassador Alpo Rusi's remarkable work and publications that were prompted by his own purgatory as a target of spy suspicions - accusations to which a court process found him not guilty. Over the past years Rusi has published many findings from the archives of the KGB's East German proxy. His case also constitutes a good reminder of the fact that many of those who were noted down as contacts or subjects of development in KGB or Stasi archives had done nothing wrong. People regularly ended up there because they were interesting to the foreign intelligence organs due to their job or another reason. The fact that many of those who had a file were innocent should, however, not prevent honest investigations on KGB penetration in Finland. Quite the contrary, when such things are not investigated and cleared, the shadows of distrust remain haunting.

It is often repeated in Finland that during the decades of Finlandization (or its aftermath) there was never an Eastern spy exposed in the Finnish Security Police (Suojelupoliisi, a.k.a. Supo). This is not a good news, as we should place the emphasis on the word exposed. Tikka's findings make a strong case for that the leadership of the Supo was seriously compromised. This was also discussed by Rentola in his article in Tieteessä Tapahtuu. This inevitably raises thoughts about why the few cases of high treason in Finland have mostly targeted the careers of people who have been known for their pro-Western stands, or contacts who have been either burn or otherwise turned harmful for their eastern employers. Meanwhile, those who have been exposed by opened archives to have worked as agents for the Eastern Bloc, have appeared to be protected by continued immunity.

The book outlines a Finnish tradition in which our political and economic elite have made a deal with the devil. Members of the elite have gained various benefits from this - money, peace and stability - but the soul of the Finnish nation has been repeatedly maimed in the process. The pathologies and fetiches of the Finnish political culture are symptoms of this soul damage.

There have been periods of time when one evil has been useful in ridding Finland from another. In other times Finns have been prepared to pay a shockingly high price for peace. While such policies can be argued for in certain situations, this should not lead to the conclusion that Alexander II, Kerenski, Lenin, or Hitler, were great benefactors and friends of Finland. It just was that Finland's cause happened to fit their power-political calculations at given times.

To a certain extent Finland can benefit from a fame of balancing acts between bigger players. Even in the current leadership of the state, the idea of sitting on a fence has gained a frightening amount of popularity. They should just remember that they cannot afford being stupid in such a game. Otherwise the same game will quickly lead them to war - or even worse, to the demise of the Finnish nation. It is not rarely that the "friends" have made their plans include the destruction of Finland as a nation - genocide, deportation to Siberia, absorption by a "more remarkable" nation, or just a role as a simple puffer or front.

Finns are destined to play for their freedom and existence just like Afghans, Chechens, and Georgians have done for millennia, sandwiched between bigger empires. That was long before the game - and civilization - arrived in our northern woods. This game does not treat well those who are naive and stupid. On the other hand, one should not overestimate one's ability to be cunning, because cunning can only bring tactical victories - in strategy, resources and power still rule.

Finland has stumbled and humbled itself in ways that have repeatedly jeopardized the future of our nation. Yet we have had some luck with us. One should however not count much on luck in geopolitics. One should not trust in empty deals: "an agreement, eto tolko bumaga," like the film about the February Manifesto remarked. It does not make sense to bow at royalties and other totem animals, like some of our pompous academics have done in a spell of decorations and favours. Especially one should not trust blindly in our political and economic elite, who have repeatedly manifested their willingness to sacrifice the freedom of their people on the altar of their own short-term interests.

It is largely thank to free, armed peasants that Finland has been saved from much worse. Also Georgians and Chechens can be grateful for quite similar things, in somewhat different circumstances, for their continued existence as nations.

Editorial work of the Lustration book has been decent, although it could have been more meticulous. The articles, and especially Luukkanen's parts, still contain needlessly many typos, missing words, and transliteration errors, which at least the editor should have checked and corrected. Luckily the number of factual errors is much lower. Yet it should be noted that Timo Kivimäki, who was convicted in Denmark for espionage targeting his own students for the Russian intelligence, was not hired afterwards for a position in the Aleksanteri Institute (as claimed by the book) but in the Department of World Policy, of Helsinki University.

Sunday, 25 August 2013

Syria and Impenitent Evil

(Originally on 23 August, 2013.)

Hannah Arendt, who pondered a lot upon the nature of totalitarianism, wrote about the difficulty of applying the conception of forgiveness in situations where faced with impenitent evil, like for instance in the case of Nazi Germany. She made the point that even though Jesus recommended forgiveness, this was not automatic and unconditional, but instead, took place in response to apology. In a parallel manner, mercy responsed to repentance. Unrepenting, impenitent evil was doomed to perdition.

Yesterday (22 August 2013) the world was faced by countless videos from the suburban areas of the Syrian capital Damascus, where the regime of Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russia and Iran, used chemical weapons of mass destruction to kill civilians. Still today, the most modest accounts reported at least hundreds dead, while the highest accounts referred to around two thousand. Part of the video material shows rows after rows of dead children lain on floors, while others document the efforts of medical staff and volunteers to help those suffering the impacts or dying as a result of being exposed to nerve gas. Some of the helpers suffer from symptoms themselves and die.

A large number of those dead seem to be children. The Syrian regime and the propaganda and useful idiots backing it have claimed the victims were terrorists, or try to suggest the Syrian opposition bombed their own supporters with chemical weapons.

This WMD attack was not the first of its kind in Syria, although the number of victims seems to be much higher than in any of the dozen to twenty previous chemical weapons attacks that have been reported from Syria. The Assad regime is also not the first one in the region to use chemical weapons as a means of genocide on civilians. Saddam Hussein used them against the Kurds in the famous massacre of Halabja, and also against Iraqi Shi'ites and against Iran.

Wait a minute: haven't we been told since 2003 that Saddam never had any weapons of mass destruction? Of course that's what we've been told with high volume, but it doesn't make it true. Saddam not only had WMD, he was also one of those Middle Eastern dictators to use these weapons against his own people. When he did so, the United States did not make a punitive attack on Iraq - and neither did anyone else. On the other hand, the US did invade Iraq much later, when it happened to suit the US interests.

That Saddam had WMD was not the big lie of the Iraq War. What you could take as the lie was instead the claim that those weapons would have posed an immediate threat to the US, and that they would have been the main reason for the war to overthrow Saddam's regime and to replace it with a more cooperative one. The Syrian dictator Assad - who shares the ideology of Ba'athist national-socialism with late Saddam - knows this very well. He has assessed that he is in the same position where Saddam was at the time of Halabja - not in the same position where Saddam was in 2003. You see, the difference between these two is the calculation over the probability of the leading Western great powers having both capability and willingness to defy Russia, the eternal supporter of cruel dictators, by overthrowing dictators by means of force.

At the time of Halabja, Western powers did not have such willingness. In 2003 they had. The Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi calculated that he would not be stopped by means of force, so he could launch a campaign of unscrupulous mass destruction to the popular uprising. He miscalculated. Even though the US was extremely unwilling to make a military intervention to Libya, it changed its mind when not just the entire Arab World but also the leading European powers France and Britain took a stand to support military intervention and finally persuaded the US to provide the muscle.

Without the intervention, Libya would today face the same situation as Syria. Libyan people would have most cruelly murdered in perhaps hundreds of thousands, and the escalating war would have a catastrophic impact on entire North Africa - especially the neighbours Tunisia and Egypt - as well as on the Sahel. Without Western intervention to Libya, Qaddafi would have got continued support from Russia and perhaps also from Iran, Venezuela, North Korea and other supporters of cruel authoritarianism. These countries would have armed Qaddafi, sent special troops to North Africa and destabilized the region a lot, to the great detriment of the West and the Western-minded constituencies in the Arab countries.

Of course the Libyan situation still continued long enough to have some negative impact. The mercenary troops Qaddafi had recruited from the Sahel countries were expelled from Libya but they took refuge in the deserts of the Sahel, regrouped and aligned themselves and their heavy weaponries with the previously marginal regional Islamist groups and Tuareg rebels, proceeding to eventually conquering all of northern Mali. France, however, dealed with the situation quite elegantly and with minimal casualties to their own.

The successful interventions to Libya and Mali have not removed the threat of extremist movements from North Africa and the Sahel, but they have significantly limited it. Most importantly, they have isolated it to the non-state sphere, to be a threat posed by relatively weak illegal combat groups. That is not a very significant threat to the wider security policy, even though it will keep making some headlines. If the US did not intervene in Libya, and France in Mali, the situation in the entire region would be remarkably more horrible. Syria, if anything, should make this point clear.

Although the war propaganda supporting the Assad regime - backed by the global reach of Russia and its allies - attempts to make us at least doubt that the WMD attack on civilians in Damascus suburbs was not committed by the Assad regime, those with better knowledge have probably little doubt about it.

The Assad regime is the only actor in Syria with large quantities of chemical weapons and the means to use them in such a large attack against civilians. Assad's regime has previously used these chemical weapons against the Syrian people. Assad's regime has had no inhibitions or hesitation to murder hundreds of thousands of civilians and to bomb the largest cities of Syria into dust.

Yet for the sake of assurance we do well to consider the four most common alternative conspiracy theories: 1) That the attack was staged by the Syrian opposition to frame the Assad regime as the culprits and thereby to internationalize the conflict. 2) That the attack was a provocation by one of the jihadi groups fighting Assad but outside the actual opposition. These jihadi groups largely consist of foreigners. 3) That the attack was done by a foreign country, for example the US or Israel, in order to gain an excuse to invade Syria. 4) That the attack was done by a "rogue element", a local commander or militia fighting on Assad's side but without authorization from the president.

In my opinion, all these four conspiracy theories are implausible, but let me look at all of them shortly before coming back to the reasons I believe were on the background of the decision by the Assad regime and its state supporters to use WMD against civilian population.

1) At the same time when the attack took place, the pro-Assad war propaganda started spreading the idea that the Syrian opposition would have bombed itself with nerve gas in order to blame the regime. This theory would presuppose that the opposition had got possession of WMD. Who would have given such weapons to them? In addition, the theory would presuppose they had the means and the opportunity to use these weapons in the capital Damascus. Moreover, the theory would require that once having got possession of WMD the opposition would have made the absurd decision to use them against their own people instead of striking against the Syrian army or the shabiha.
Unlike the Assad regime that depends on the foreign support provided by Russia and Iran, the Syrian opposition is completely dependent on the support, combatants and protection provided by the Syrian population. Getting caught for such an outrageous act would be extremely high, even if one would try to put the blame on someone else.
Besides, this conspiracy theory is made unreliable by the fact that it repeats almost identically the similar propaganda that was used to question the war crimes of Russia's allies in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. Also in those cases the world was flooded with disinformation claiming that Bosnians, Kosovars, Chechens and Georgians had bombed themselves or committed massacres in order to engage Western powers on their side. Later it became evident that only Serbia and Russia had committed the mentioned kind of mass destruction on civilians. When the contents, narratives and means of spreading such propaganda continue same from conflict to conflict, there's reason to suspect they originate in the same or related spin factories.
2) Some of the groups fighting Assad are about as repulsive as the Assad regime and its militias. As the Syrian War has dragged on and the Syrian opposition has remained isolated and lacking hard international support (while receiving some soft support), Syria started receiving many fanatic jihadists from the surrounding countries and from Europe. They saw in Syria a religious jihad rather than the struggle for freedom and better future against cruel tyranny that the Syrians saw in it. Some of the jihadi groups are wicked in their thought to the extent that one could basically expect from them provocations that are totally contrary to the goals of the Syrian opposition. Some of these groups also seem to give as little value to human life as the Assad regime.
Yet it is implausible that the jihadists committed the attack to Damascus suburbs. These groups would have even bigger difficulties than for instance the Free Syrian Army to convince anyone to hand them chemical WMD. In spite of their separateness, they are still to some extent dependent on a level of support from the Syrian population, and in order to avoid condemnation they would have to hide their complicity to such an outrageous attack both from outsiders and from the rest of the Syrian opposition. Getting caught of such an act would mean certain condemnation even among those international jihadi circles, whose support is necessary for the groups fighting in Syria. It would be a risk they could not afford taking.
The jihadists would finally lack an actual motive. The thing these groups want least is that Westerners get involved in the Syrian situation. On the contrary, the jihadists have benefitted from the isolation of the Syrian opposition, and gained foothold for the very reason that the West has not helped the Syrians. The jihadists do not absolutely not want to see Assad's rule replaced by a pro-Western and Western-backed coalition. They want Islamic rule. That cannot be built up by nerve-gasing Muslims. 
The best known jihadi groups fighting in Syria, such as Jabhat an-Nusra and Dawlat al-Islamiyya, are sure to be religious fanatics, but they have tried to win the population's trust with their discipline and by punishing criminals. The hard-earned reputation would be lost forever by making massive attacks against Muslim civilians. If one of the jihadi groups would happen to obtain chemical weapons, they could be believed to have a temptation to use those weapons in terrorism against the West or Israel. They might also be interested in passing such weapons on to extremist groups operating somewhere else, which is one of the traditional fears on the background of containing the proliferation of WMD.
3) The third conspiracy theory - the one supposing the attack was done by an external state that seeks an excuse to invade Syria - usually points finger at either Israel or the US. This theory would presuppose these states are prepared to risk their international reputation by resorting to such an outrageous provocation. Yet both the US and Israel depend on the support of the Western World - not for example on that of the morally more flexible Russia. Getting exposed for such an attack would be devastating to them even after decades - something that has never really been a burden for Russia or Iran (both exposed for outrageous provocations by research years after the actual acts). At least in the US large-scale unscrupulous political conspiracies are made very difficult by the high risk of leaks.
Even if we believe that either the US or Israel would be prepared for such an attack only to gain an excuse for invasion, we would then have to assume two things: First, that these countries want to invade Syria. Secondly, that they have not previously had a sufficient excuse for such invasion. I think both these assumptions are false. Both the US and Israel have been extremely reluctant to intervene militarily in the Syrian situation, and the Assad regime and its backers know this. Moreover, even if the Americans and the Israelis had now changed their minds and desired to launch a major military intervention, there would have been plenty of excuses for this from the last two years.
The US has known all the way that it will not be able to get acceptance from Russia, Assad's strongest supporter, for any UN-authorized action against Assad. Meanwhile, Russia and Iran are not bound by UN authorizations; their military intervention has continued ruthlessly and with impunity throughout the Syrian conflict. If the US wanted an intervention, it could any time gather a unilateral coalition of the willing, since Britain, France, Turkey and a significant group of Arab countries have for long wished the use of force against Assad. They have lacked courage due to the absence of the American muscle. One of the most important reasons for the US reluctance is the experience that as soon as the US takes a stand backing an intervention, the others would load main responsibility and most of the costs on the Americans.
4) The fourth conspiracy theory is a kind of face-saving formula. People want to believe that the attack was committed by a local commander without Assad's authorisation, or perhaps one of the militias and extremist groups fighting on Assad's side, like the shabiha or the Lebanese Hizbullah, which for the last months had been responsible for most of Assad's military gains in Syria. Hizbullah is likely to have the means for such an attack, given that it gets the WMD from the Syrian regime. Yet it faces the same problems I mentioned in reference to the jihadi groups opposing Assad. Hizbullah is not independent from the support it gets from Arab populations around the region.
It is extremely unlikely that any local commander under the Assad regime could make a decision on the use of WMD, especially against civilian population sleeping in their residential areas. I find it obvious that the decision has been made on the highest political level, and that Russia and Iran have been at least informed, more likely consulted on the decision. I find it likely that Russia and Iran have been conscious and even given their active aceptance for the attack, which of course makes it the more frightening. 

Why then would Assad resort to such an attack at the time when exactly one year has been passed from Obama's red line claim on the use of chemical weapons, and when the UN observers have just arrived in the country? Exactly that's why. What we see here is a shocking demonstration of power, meant to paralyze opposition, to frighten off neighbouring countries, and to humiliate especially Obama but at the same time the entire Western international community. The UN is blocked by Russia's veto and will not be capable of investigating these attacks. The Assad regime already prevented observers from getting access to the alleged sites where chemical weapons were used. Is it likely the regime would do this if the attacks were committed by the opposition?

So far every time when the UN observers arrived in Syria, the Assad regime has committed some kind of "terrorist" provocation to back its propaganda. Yesterday's attack was of course much larger and claimed much more victims than the previous ones, but the propaganda materials seemed prepared in advance and were fed to the world in the usual order.

Therefore, the conclusion concerning the case seems to take the most horrifying shape. It is impenitent evil we're dealing with here. The political message of the attack is: "We can do whatever - and we do it with impunity. The world will not intervene." This message is addressed to all the domestic resistance: "Look what cowards your supposed supporters are - they are now shivering in fear and are incapable of doing anything for you. Surrender unconditionally or we're prepared to kill even the entire population if we have to."

It is likely that the message is also addressed to the neighbouring countries, especially Jordan and Turkey. If this is the case, a secret outrageous threat has probably been communicated to these countries in advance, and the Damascus attack was a demonstration of Syria being serious about the threat. Russia has probably worked Israel day and night to ensure inaction. At the same time it's likely that the neighbouring countries have received assurances that if they back off, WMD is only used against the Syrian people. This is what the regime can do with impunity as long as Russia uses its veto in the UN and no Western power is prepared for unilateral intervention.

As a precendent this case is most terrible. If the leading Western powers do not react, the risk increases significantly that also other dictators will once again resort to open genocidal action against their populations - and some even against small neighbouring countries. The United States is thoroughly humiliated and its credibility in the entire world and especially in the Middle East will plunge. Saudi Arabia and Russia have already approached each other and the Saudi chief of intelligence has offered agreement on weapons sales with Russia, "because it seems the US is retreating in the region".

It may also happen that Assad and his supporters take their gamble one step too far, and the red lines that at the moment have no credibility whatsoever will suddenly become real. Qaddafi did lose his gamble. Assad, too, can still lose it. Russia and Iran, however, are world champions in gambling, and they've calculated that the US doesn't dare to check the cards but will retreat instead. The following months will show whether that calculation is correct.

Even if Assad finally loses the game, Russia and Iran have already been successful for the gamble they're waged for two years in order to stop the Arab Spring and turn it upside down. They have managed to once again trap the US and the international community in a situation where all their options are bad. Retreating would mean huge defeats in the MENA region, both measured in stability and influence but especially in Western prestige. An intervention, on the other hand, would mean getting once agian tied up with large economic, political and diplomatic risks, which Russia and Iran will seek to exploit to the maximum - trying to maximize Western losses. For Russia and Iran, Assad's defeat would be an important loss, but in no way the end of the game.

Wednesday, 21 August 2013


(Originally on 7 June, 2011: introductory post for a series from a trip to Morocco.)

In May [2011] I travelled to Morocco, where I took part in a remarkable biological expedition. The main target areas where in the mountains of the Middle and High Atlas, but as side trips we also visited the Anti-Atlas and the Draa Valley. Our flights were both through Spain, so we also came to spend nights both in Madrid, the capital of Castile and the entire Spain, and in Barcelona, the capital of Catalonia.

My previous trip to Morocco took place in December 2003, and at that time I travelled quite extensively on the country's coastal rim, including the northwestern wetlands, as well as in the Middle Atlas and in the Draa Valley. Therefore some of the places we visited this summer were familiar to me. Already back then Morocco was a nice country to travel around: tourist infrastructure was well developed, roads were good, access to places good and traffic relatively safe.

The upheavals of this year's Arab Spring were much less visible in Morocco than in many of the other countries in the region, because the Kingdom of Morocco wisely started reforms well in advance and therefore Moroccans already enjoyed many such liberties and rights that the Libyans and Syrians could only dream about. The Moroccan government, from the beginning of the Arab Spring, allowed demonstrations and abstained from beating up the crowds of youth. As a result, demonstrations in Morocco have remained mostly peaceful. Only in one industrial city in northern Morocco there were casualties; the riots there seem to have been organized by the radical left.

Shortly before our trip, terrorists blew up a bomb at Café Argan, popular among tourists and locals alike at the most famous square in old Marrakesh. It is believed that the culprits were local radical Islamists, but their motive was more opposition against the government than international jihadism. As a result of the attack, however, we saw more policemen and gendarme during our trip than my companion had seen the previous year on a similar expedition. Otherwise no insecurity was visible in Morocco, although in several minor towns we saw small and peaceful demonstrations focusing on employment and other local issues.

The Arabic name for Morocco, Maghreb, means the Land of Sunset - in an other word, the West. In its general English use the term has been expanded to mean all of the western parts of North Africa in addition to Morocco. Usually it covers Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, sometimes also Morocco's southern neighbour Mauritania, which can be counted as an Arab country. The Arab reached the Atlantic coast in Morocco and Mauritania as early as in the seventh century, overthrowing the Berber kingdom that had previously ruled the area. The Arab rule led to wide assimilation and Arabianization of the Berbers. In spite of this, a significant part of the population in Maghreb, especially in mountain and desert areas, considers themselves as Berbers, and many also speak the various Berber languages as their mother tongue. In addition, there are many Tuaregs living in the southern desert areas.

During the Idrisid, Almoravid and Almohad dynasties, Morocco was a regional great power, dominating the western parts of North Africa as well as the Iberian Peninsula, which was ruled by the Muslim Moors until the Reconquista. Arab Andalusia, with its capital shifting between Córdoba and Granada, was an impressive cradle of civilization up until 1492, when the last Muslim state in Iberia, the Emirate of Granada, was destroyed. (Even before that, Granada had been for nearly 250 years subjected as a vassal of the Kingdom of Castile.) The Reconquista and later the Inquisition led to genocide, persecution and expulsions of Muslims, Jews, and later also of Moriscos, the former Muslims who had converted into Christianity. The roots of a large segment of the modern Arabs of Morocco and Mauritania are in Iberia.

In addition to the diversity already mentioned, the Arabic dialect spoken in Morocco is quite far from Middle Eastern Arabic. It contains many influences from Berber languages as well as more recent influences from French and Spanish as remainders of the colonial period during which France and Spain ruled their zones in Morocco. The modern Kingdom of Morocco gained independence from French colonial power in the 1950s and some of the Spanish-controlled areas were annexed at the same time, whereas Ifni was annexed only in 1969 and Western Sahara in the seventies. Spain still rules two towns in northern Morocco: Ceuta and Melilla.

In Western Sahara, Morocco's rule has been contested by Polisario, a radical leftist militant organization backed by Algeria, but nowadays mainly operates in Algeria and abroad, and Western Sahara is relatively calm and safe area to travel. The Western Saharans consider themselves as Arabs belonging to the Sahrawi tribe, although they, like other Moroccans, are mixed a lot with Berbers and the descendants of African former slaves.

Since the current King Muhammad VI came to power, Morocco has actively sought democratic reforms, and besides Jordan, it has been an exemplary country for developing Arab democracy. Morocco has traditionally maintained close relationship with France, and through, to the European Union, while the quarrel over Western Sahara has strained its relations with Spain. Morocco's main security threat has come from the larger eastern neighbour Algeria, which has for long aspired for regional dominance and used Polisario as a tool to reach the Atlantic and to isolate Morocco. The Moroccan-Algerian land border is still closed and one can only travel between the two countries through a third country or by flight.

Recently the antagonism within the Arab World - especially the authoritarian governments of Syria, Libya and Algeria versus the reformist and/or Western-oriented countries - has pushed the kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco to seek closer relations with the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. One can easily understand Jordan's membership in the Gulf Cooperation Council, but now membership is also sought by Morocco, which is located far from the Gulf, in the other end of the Arab World. It seems as if the GCC is becoming a club for monarchies, sharing little more in common but a common foe: Iran.

Monday, 19 August 2013

The Land of Saint George

(Originally on 5 July 2012.)

Two years ago in summer 2010 I visited Georgia and Armenia, and wrote about the experiences of that journey in Tbilisi, Mtskheta, Yerevan and the mountains around the Kazbek in my Finnish blog. Back then I travelled with a Lebanese American friend. This time we were a group of four young men. Besides myself, only one of my three companions had been to the Caucasus before, as his mother's roots were there.

We flew into Tbilisi from Estonia and rented a car, which we used to drive around most of Georgia. I and one of my companions had to return a bit earlier due to other commitments, whereas the other two continued to visit even Abkhazia and Karabagh. The areas that were not visited this time consisted of Svanetia in the northwest, Djavakhetia in the southwest, and Kakhetia in the east, where I ventured before the era covered by my blog together with a friend of mine now residing in East Africa. We even visited the famous Pankisi Gorge. Back then we were still jolly little undergraduates, and on the same long journey we also revisited the cultural diversity of Eastern Anatolia, the Qamishli Spring in Syria, and the bazaars and internet cafés of Hawler, Suleymaniya, Kirkuk and Mosul in northern Iraq. "There may be enough destination in our journey, but what makes it worthy of the trouble is the way there itself."

Also this time, travelling took place in an outstanding atmosphere. One would think that taking four confident, cosmopolitan and verbally talented young men, whose summed IQ probably exceeds six hundred, and putting them for a couple of weeks into a Renault Mégane in the middle of the Caucasian honour culture, throwing in some hatchapuris and a few bottles of Saperavi wines per man, one could not avoid clashes of egos. Yet no, the good spirits of our expedition survived even all the debates on sensitive questions of international politics and cultural clashes in a civilized and lofty atmosphere. All my three travel companions shared respectably wide general knowledge and they were socially active promises of our internationalizing homeland; two of them active web discussants and the third one an otherwise important eminence gris.

Compared with two years ago, Georgia has actually just increased its attractiveness as a travel destination. With the exceptions of Batumi (marketed for the newly rich) and the core centre of Tbilisi, the price level in Georgia has remained very affordable, while the quality of everything has steadily risen as a result of large-scale improvement of infrastructure, renovation of the city centres, and the new, more international generations taking over. Georgia is a safe country for tourism. Roads are mostly in good condition, although one should carry a map along, because signs are generally insufficient or illogically placed - even if one's able to read the Georgian alphabets.

For the beginning, Tbilisi: located in Kartli, in the gorge of the Kura River that flows towards the Caspian Sea, the Georgian capital has continued its remarkable face-lift. Two years ago the Rustaveli Avenue leading to the Freedom Square, and the Old Town were already nicely restored, and I wrote about how there was now a concentration of bar and café streets in Old Town that was reminiscent of Beirut. Also across the river in Metekhi restoration has proceeded with speed and we could now see that also the Mardjanishvili district has been restored with its imperial nineteenth-century buildings, fountains and parks. I recall anticipating two years ago that there could be yet another concentration of social and evening activities in Mardjanishvili, and this seems to have happened.

In spite of the Russian invasion four years ago and the economic blockade and political attempts at destabilization ever since, Georgia has continued its development with a surprising pace. Russian activities and the global depression, however, have had an impact on the spirits of the Georgians. They have kept that somewhat bitter, disillusioned and frustrated tone I observed already two years ago. The economic depression seems to have hit the country even worse than the Russian invasion, which after all resulted in the loss of only a couple of additional border valleys, in addition to what Russia had been occupying since early 1990s already.

Georgia's response to the constant Russian bullying has been quite interesting. Georgia has, for instance, unilaterally opened its borders with Russia and granted all Russian citizens a unilateral visa freedom to visit Georgia. Georgia also allows the inhabitants of the occupied territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) to travel to Georgia. Russia, however, does not allow Georgians any access to its own territory or the Georgian territories it continues to occupy.

Along the road to Kazbek in the Caucasus Mountains we saw how numerous Russian families had entered Georgia with their own cars, to have vacation and look around in Georgia. They cannot miss sensing the greater freedom prevailing there and witnessing with their own eyes and ears the falsehood of the propagandistic image that the Russian media gives of the neighbouring country. Seen from this point of view, Georgia's unilateral concessions actually constitute a potentially successful charm offensive, as many ordinary Russians can now acquaint with a reality quite different from the image they would get in Russia.

Since Russia occupied Sukhumi and bombed Poti, Georgia has paid a lot of effort to improve its third port city, Batumi, the third-largest city of Georgia and the capital of the autonomous region of Adjaria. Batumi is located on the Black Sea coast near the Turkish border. Two years ago I didn't visit there, so I couldn't witness what had been built by then, but still eight years ago it used to be in a quite dilapidated and post-Soviet condition.

Now an amazing kitchyland has been erected in Batumi in a short period of time - some kind of a Black Sea version of Dubai with grandiose marble palaces, neon-lighted glass towers, pompous restaurants, casinos and luxury villas, gold-covered statues, seraphs, cherubs, dancing nymphs and fountains. Batumi intends to go even further since everywhere around the city one can see new construction projects, offers of luxury real estate, and there is apparently a plan to construct a fountain spraying Georgia's national booze chacha. That is sure to attract Russian tourists and might also constitute a good trump card to market Batumi for Finnish tourists.

I have no idea where all the initial investment has come from but the place is far from being deserted. There is apparently a sizable and affluent constituency of holiday-makers who have discovered Batumi. Some undoubtedly are newly rich Georgians living abroad, but judging from the fragments of Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish heard around, a large part of the people here are Azerbaijani, Ukrainian and Russian newly rich, including the upper middle class of the oil-wealthy Baku, Turks with Caucasian roots, and amazingly enough, lots of Israelis and Iranians, too. An Estonian contact we met cracked a joke about dawn in Batumi's nightclubs where the last ones to linger on the dance floors are the Israelis and the Iranians since they have so much to talk about.

A short drive north of Batumi there's another resort town, the much more moderate Kobuleti, which was full of smaller and more affordable family hotels. There most of the holiday-makers seemed to be of the domestic stock. It is good that also ordinary Georgians have a Black Sea beach resort so close to Batumi, which has turned Mediterranean by its price level. We also visited the port city of Poti, which seemed quite dormant compared with the coastal towns further south, although even there the destruction inflicted by Russian bombings had been quickly repaired and the commercial harbour was functional again.

Georgia's second-largest city and an important cultural centre Kutaisi was once upon the time the capital of the Imeretian Kingdom. There we lived for the astonishingly inexpensive price of 40 lari in a white marble villa, across the river in a hillside near the cathedral and overlooking a wonderful scene over the city. The villa now hosted a family hotel, and we could chill out at its terrace, enjoy the scenery over the town's skyline and consume the five litre canister of Saperavi wine that we had picked from a vineyard on the way here.

The climate of Kartli and Kakhetia, inhabited by the Karts of East Georgia, is more continental - hot in summers, and also drier as one moves further east. On the western side of the watershed forested mountain range where Gori and Surami are located, it turns into the hot and humid subtropical climate of the Black Sea, and the mountains descend towards Kutaisi to form the plains of the Rioni Valley. The Rioni River lets into the Black Sea at Poti, where also the protected delta area of Kolkheti is located. We returned from Batumi through Guria and the Supsa Valley into Central Georgia. There's also an ethnic difference between western and eastern Georgia: The East is inhabited by the majority ethnic group of the Karts, while the West is home to the speakers of Western Georgian languages, the Megrelians (Mingrelians), the Svans, the Adjarians and the Lazis - the last of whom live partly on the Turkish side. Historically majority of the Adjarians and Lazis were Muslims whereas the Karts, the Megrelians and the Svans are Christian.

We also visited the northwestern town of Zugdidi and the Enguri River that forms the boundary to Abkhazia. Atmosphere up there was surprisingly phlegmatic and sleepy. The soldiers gave us permission to go to the side of occupied Abkhazia and come back. Still in the early 2000s Zugdidi was the base of Georgia's radical nationalists who wanted to win Abkhazia back, but now it was just like any Georgian town. Zviad Gamsakhurdia's statue and memorial decorated the central park, but otherwise the Abkhazian conflict was hardly visible at all in the streets of Zugdidi.

One cannot claim to have really been to the Caucasus if one one has not visited the Caucasus Mountains. It is there one can also find the cultural soul of the region. Had we had more time, we would have gone to Svanetia or some other slightly more difficult mountain area, but as time was limited, we chose again the simpler solution and drove through Ananuri, Pasanauri and Gudauri along the Georgian Military Highway up to Stepantsminda, at the foothills of the Kazbek.

We drove to the border crossing leading to the Russian Republic of North Ossetia to see the ruins of Queen Tamara's castle, and we climbed up to the mountain to the Tsminda Sameba churche, where patriotic Georgian youth make spirited excursions, carrying the Georgian flags for good poses and singing patriotic songs. And we also visited the Darial Gorge to wonder the breathtaking sceneries that had so inspired Lermontov and Pushkin. Griffon Vultures were soaring over the mountain paths of Gveleti, and Alpine Choughs around the concrete abomination from the Soviet era that has been erected in the middle of most majestic gorge landscape before the Djvari Pass, to celebrate the "friendship of peoples" between Georgians and Russians.

I recommend my readers, too, to make the trip to Georgia as long as it is still there, and as long as you can experience it as a free country. Renting a car is an excellent way to acquaint with that fascinating, regionally and culturally diverse country, where every valley and region has its own character. Travelling in Georgia is easy and safe. It is easy to find inexpensive hotels and guesthouses in towns, while in smaller villages one can often find "granny accommodation". Finns and most Westerners don't need visa to Georgia, and also otherwise Georgia hasn't obsessed it with controlling foreigners since the Rose Revolution in 2003. Only one of the hotels we visited during the entire trip actually wanted to see our passports.

For those who do not have the opportunity to travel, I could recommend for example an armchair trip into the eleventh-century chivalry romantics in the form of reading Georgia's national epic, the Knight in the Panther's Skin. Let us quote what the Finnish Wikipedia writes about the book:

The epic strongly reflects Georgia's location in a crossroads of cultures and trade routes. At Rustaveli's time, the country had been part of the Christian world for almost thousand years already, but it was situated at the edge of the strengthening Islamic culture that lived its golden age of prosperity. Also the characters of the story represent different cultures and traditions, yet they live in a tolerant coexistence. Although the Knight in the Panther's Skin has been written in the Middle Ages and it carries lots of similarities with European chivalry romantics, it anticipates the Renaissance in its humanist and liberal spirit. [...]
Rustaveli makes personal freedom, pure love, and justice central themes in his epic. The heroes of the story are pure-hearted, brave fighters for justice and happiness. In its basic tone the epic is optimistic. Although Rustaveli's patriotic, political view on a powerful central state steered by an enlightened autocrat is strongly present in the story, the story is not limited in its national scope, but instead delivers its message generally to the humankind. Even the theme of intellectual and moral equality between man and woman is visible in the Knight in the Panther's Skin.

Unlike the grotesque Soviet monument of forced Druzhba, which was mentioned above, the heroic epic penned by the poet and courtier Shota Rustaveli is a genuine cultural monument for a peaceful coexistence of different civilizations. Like Georgia itself, the epic places itself to the border zone, where it guards the gates between the East and West, and cultivates flourishing rose gardens along the gateposts. Like Georgia's national saint, it protects civilization, sometimes in a seemingly desperate struggle against the roaring mouths of fire-spitting dragons.

Friday, 2 November 2012


(Originally on 31 October 2012.)

I spent ten days in the South Arabian Sultanate of Oman, during which time I managed to drive from one end of that country to the other twice. It is my intention in the coming days to write something about Oman and its fascinating nature also for my blog readers. Meanwhile, however, let us have a little cultural article, that is, a review of the newest James Bond film, Skyfall.

When I got back from Oman, I had one afternoon and night in the Emirates. My flights were from Kabul to Sharjah (Shariqa) and from there to Muscat (Masqat), and vice versa. Sharjah is the more conservative and quiet neighbouring emirate to Dubai. On my way to Oman I went through three different malls on the Sharjah side in search for certain specific electronics I needed, yet without success. So on my way back I took a taxi from the Sharjah airport directly to Dubai, heading for the largest mall of Dubai and possibly of the entire world, the Dubai Mall. There I made many a shopping and purchase of equipment and necessities for Afghanistan, but finished by night, and as the flight back to Kabul was only at 5 AM, it was only convenient to spend the night at the cinema.

I found Skyfall a positive surprise for a Bond film, since with the delightful exception of Casino Royale, most of the Bond films of the recent years have been quite boring and superficial rumbles. Skyfall appeared as a conscious return to the roots, in many respects in fact. Unfortunately, I have never read Ian Fleming's original Bond novels, so with the exception of the obvious cases I have only a dim idea of which novel (of any) each movie is based on. You can read about the subject in this entry.

However, the story in the background of Skyfall seems very similar to the one in the background of the old film The Man with the Golden Gun, based on Fleming's similarly named novel. The main villain of that film was a cold-bloodied Latin American paid assassin named Francisco Scaramanga (after a co-student Fleming was in bad terms with in his college years). Scaramanga has been trained by the KGB but in the movie he becomes a rogue actor with a criminal agenda. Skyfall has a villain with a similar background, although the training came from the Brits instead of the Russians. However, Skyfall's rogue has been made more schizophrenic and more pervert than the man with the golden gun, who was an unemotional killer robot in the Cold War spirit. Skyfall's super-villain Raúl Silva, whose name probably sounds like Silver by purpose, appears as an oedipally complexed typical lone wolf terrorist, not very different from Anders Breivik.

While so far Bond has appeared never aging and in character youthful, although played by middle-aged actors, in Skyfall he has actually got old, disillusioned, and even descends at one point to drinking in the seaside bars of the Bosporus. After Istanbul, however, he gets to chase the paid assassin in Shanghai, where some smartly modified déjà vu scenes from the Golden Gun are seen. Silver Silva has built his secret base of evil in the ghost island of Hashima, off the coast of Nagasaki, which in the real life hosts an abandoned mining community.

From Hashima the film travels on to London, where the going gets quite contemporary, but it is the very contemporary security hysteria and dependence on nerds that fails big time, and this leads to an idealization of everything old school, from English patriotism to good old Scottish highlander defiance, old-fashioned cars and guns. To avoid spoiling anyone's movie experience I won't reveal what finally happens to the female M of the neo-Bonds, but there's a nice wordplay also in her case, like in Silva's, because Em becomes Emma in the words of the old Scot guarding the mansion. At the end of the movie there's also a spectacular return to the beginning of the old Bond films. The chairman of the parliamentary Intelligence Committee, who reveals his old-fashioned manliness by picking the gun in the parliamentary hearing that has become target of a terrorist attack, becomes the new M, and Miss Moneypenny returns to the scene as his secretary.

In many respects what pleased me in Skyfall was the old fashion and the return to the roots - Bond's roots, Fleming's views, and the roots of the entire genre. I wish also the Mission Impossibles and other movie series would manage to modernize Cold War phenomena to the 21st century in an equally successful and stylish manner as Skyfall has managed to do with the world of Bond. Among the Bond movies, for example, it would be difficult to do that to The Living Daylights, which was one of the best and most meaningful of the old Bond films. The context of the that movie consisted of the defector cases of the Cold War and the Afghanistan War. Today it would be hard to adjust the understanding for the legitimate freedom struggle of the Afghans against Soviet imperialism to the politically correct conditions of our time, blurred into an Islamophonic and anti-American mess.

Feminists for sure are not going to like Skyfall. The female M makes inconsiderate decisions and gets emotional. In the parliamentary hearing a dilettantish young female minister barks and lectures at people wiser and listens only to her own voice. A beautiful young female agent understands that her place is not in the field with a gun but in a clean office, working as a secretary to an old-fashioned officer. In Skyfall the postmodernism of recent times seems to have finally turned into some kind of neoconservative post-postmodernism, where it is once again appreciated that men are men and women are women. It is once again recognized that heroes are supposed to have straight backbones and the villains instead are the bent and crooked self-victimizers, whose revenge for their traumas on innocent civilians is wrong and unjustified, and that's why they must be stopped. This follows Fleming's spirit much more loyally than about any of the films made in the same genre in the last twenty years.

At the side I could advertise that the pseudonym Gloomy Monologue has written an analytical review of Skyfall and the entire Bond genre in The Ulkopolitist, and it's a worthy read.

Wednesday, 10 October 2012

The Russian Shadow

(Originally on 9 October, 2012.)

On Sunday, I met with Russian colleagues and also with a famous writer, who nowadays works for a large Western newspaper. I didn't know he, too, has ended up here in Afghanistan. Of course I mentioned I had read and greatly appreciated his best-known book, which is about certain events of 1979, the rise and fall of a messianic movement. A reader of good memory can deduce who it was, because I have in the past written about that very book in this blog.

While eating traditional Russian snacks and raising toasts, it came to my mind that the current young generation of Finns is the first one that generally speaking shares a neutral attitude at Russia, considering it like any big country. The generation of my great-grandparents hated the Russkies. The generation of my grandparents feared Russia, and the threat of an occupation was still present in their subconscious. The generation of my parents, in turn, tried to paint a rosy picture of Russia, creating a false reality known as Finlandization, which a part of that generation even believed.

My generation is a case on the fence, since we have some vague memories of our childhood when the Soviet Union still existed, but we mainly grew up with the Russia of the nineties. Therefore the past images of chaos, mafia and the wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus were imprinted in our young minds. On the other hand, those younger than me, who grew up in the 2000s, have never come to personally experience the fact that the Soviet Union once existed. For them it's a joke of some kind, in no way to be taken seriously. They neither hate nor idealize Russia; they feel neither fear nor humility at it. For them Russia, to the extend it exists for them, is little more than a neutrally perceived funny "other", and countries like Estonia and Georgia have no legitimate reason to be worried about it.

Speaking of Georgia, they had elections and the opposition party Georgian Dream, led by the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, won. The blue flags of the Georgian Dream were flying all over Tbilisi when we visited Georgia late this summer. President Mikheil Saakashvili and his party, the United National Movement, conceded their electoral defeat with no further complaint, and the new government has already been formed. This should make it clear that genuine democracy has taken root in Georgia and the country would be ready to join the Baltic countries and Moldova in the club of those former Soviet republics who graduated from the transition school of democracy, were it not that Russia continues to persecute Georgia and occupies two of its regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Ukraine already visited the club for several years but after the defeat of the Orange coalition it fell back to authoritarianism, as the Russian-leaning oligarchs wrestled power back to the old regime, politruks and security services. One has to hope this doesn't happen in Georgia, but instead, Ivanishvili makes true of his promises by maintaining democracy, open society and Western integration. Saakashvili will probably continue as incumbent president till the end of his term, when it's time for the presidential elections to test the popular trust for each party again.

People have laughed a lot at Saakashvili's flamboyant style, as well as at his imaginative ideas such as distributing bottles of wine to tourists, erecting Hellenistic statues at city squares, and building police stations of glass to symbolically highlight transparency (and the battle against corruption). Despite laughter, it's a fact that Saakashvili remains in history as one of the relatively most important reformists in the region, who in less than a decade managed to eradicate low level corruption, to open up a society used to strongmen at genuine democracy, and to make Georgia an internationally attractive tourist destination.

It is understandable that like all democratic leaders, also Saakashvili had his time, after which it is wisest for him to step aside, also for the best of his own legacy. It is an essential part of pluralistic democracy that leaders change, while irreplaceable leaders are not a part of pluralistic democracy. Only when both people and leaders get used to the idea that leaders every now and then change in normal elections, democracy begins to be ripe. Even then it isn't guaranteed. It depends on both Ivanishvili and his allies and supporters whether his party can continue to protect Georgia's endangered democracy, or if Georgia will regress to the Ukrainian path. One thing is certain: Russia will not consent to leave Georgia alone; it will keep employing various ways to weaken the sovereignty of its small neighbour.